


















Universal statistical properties of poker tournaments
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We present a simple model of Texas hold’em poker tournaments which contains the two main
aspects of the game: i. the minimal bet is the blind, which grows exponentially with time; ii.players
have a finite probability to go “all-in”, hence betting all their chips. The distribution of the number
of chips of players not yet eliminated (measured in units of its average) is found to be independent
of time during most of the tournament, and reproduces accurately Internet poker tournaments data.
This model makes the connection between poker tournaments and the persistence problem widely
studied in physics, as well as some recent physical models of biological evolution or competing agents,
and extreme value statistics which arises in many physical contexts.
Physicists are now more then ever involved in the study
of complex systems which do not belong to the traditional
realm of their science. Finance (options theory,...) [1],
human networks (Internet, airports,...) [2], the dynamics
of biological evolution [3, 4] and in general of competi-
tive “agents” [5] are just a few examples of problems re-
cently addressed by statistical physicists. However, many
of these systems are not isolated and are thus sometimes
very difficult to describe quantitatively: a financial model
cannot predict the occurrence of wars or natural dis-
asters which certainly affect financial markets, nor can
it include the effect of all important external parame-
ters (China’s GDP growth, German exports...). Rather,
these studies try to capture important qualitative fea-
tures which, interestingly, are sometimes universal.
In this Letter, we study a very human and futile activ-
ity: poker tournaments. Although a priori governed by
human laws (bluff, prudence, aggressiveness...), we shall
find that some of their properties can be quantitatively
described. One of the nice aspects of a poker tourna-
ment lies in the obvious fact that it is a truly isolated
system. Two famous mathematicians [6, 7] contributed
to the science of poker. However, they concentrated on
finding the best strategies in head-to-head games (like
most of their followers [8]). Here, we introduce a simple
model which can be treated analytically and which re-
produces some properties of Internet poker tournaments.
Our main quantities of interest are the number of sur-
viving players, the distribution of their chips amount
(“stack”), the number of “chip leaders” during the tour-
nament, and the distribution of their stack. Interestingly,
the constraint that a surviving player must keep a posi-
tive stack relates poker tournaments to the problem of
persistence [9, 10], and the competitive nature of the
game connects some of our results with recent models
of competing agents [3, 4, 5]. In addition, the properties
of the “chip leader” display extreme value statistics, a
phenomenon observed in many physical systems [12].
We now describe the main aspects of a Texas hold’em
poker tournament (currently the most popular form of
poker). Initially, N0 players sit at tables accepting up
to T players. In real poker tournaments, N0 typically
lies in the range N0 ∼ 10 − 10000, and the number of
players per table is T = 10. We will not detail the precise
rules of Texas hold’em poker, as we shall see that their
actual form is totally irrelevant provided that two crucial
ingredients of the game are kept:
• Before a game starts, the two players to the left of the
dealer post “blind” bets. The blinds ensure that there is
some money in the pot to play for at the very start of
the game. The blind b increases exponentially with time,
and typically changes to the value 40 $, 60 $, 100 $, 150 $,
200 $, 300 $, 400 $,... every 10-15 minutes on Internet
tournaments, hence being multiplied by a factor 10 every
hour or so. We shall see that the growth rate of the blind
entirely controls the pace of a tournament. Therefore, the
fact that the blind (which is also the minimal bet) grows
exponentially with time must be a major ingredient of any
realistic model of poker.
• The next players post their bets (≥ b) according to
their evaluation of the two cards they each receive. There
are subsequent rounds of betting following the succes-
sive draws of five common cards. Ultimately, the betting
player with the best hand (when combined with the com-
mon cards) wins the pot. Most of the deals end up with
a player winning a small multiple of the blind. However,
during certain deals, two or more players can aggressively
raise each other, so that they finally bet a large fraction,
if not all, of their chips. This can happen when a player
goes “all-in”, hence betting all his chips. Any serious mo-
del of poker should take into account the fact that players
often bet a few blinds, but sometimes end up betting all
or a large fraction of their chips.
Once a player loses all his chips, he is eliminated. Dur-
ing the course of the tournament, some players may be
redistributed to other tables, in order to keep the num-
ber of tables minimum. Retaining the two main ingredi-
ents mentioned above, we now define a simple version of
poker which turns out to describe quantitatively the evo-
lution of real poker tournaments. The N0 initial players
(T players per table) receive the same amount of chips
x0 ≫ b0, where b0 is the initial blind (x0/b0 is typically
in the range 50− 100 in actual poker tournaments).
• The single “blinder” posts the blind, b(t) =
2b0 exp(t/t0). For the following deal, the new blinder is
the next player to the left of the current blinder.
• At each table (tables run in parallel), the players
receive one card, c, which is a random number uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1.
• The following players bet the value b with probability
e(c), if 0 ≤ c ≤ c0. e(c) is an evaluation function, whose
details will be immaterial. Intuitively, e(c) should be
an increasing function of c, implying that a player will
more often play good hands than bad ones. We tried
several forms of e(c), obtaining the same results. In our
simulations, we choose e(c) = cn, where n is the number
of players having already bet (including the blinder). In
this case, e(c) is simply the probability that c is the best
card among n + 1 random cards. This reflects the fact
that a player should be careful when playing bad hands if
many players have already bet. Determining the optimal
evaluation function for a given T (in the spirit of Borel’s
and von Neumann’s analysis for T = 2) is a formidable
task which is left for a future study.
• The first player with a card c > c0 goes all-in (hence
q = 1 − c0 is the probability to go all-in). The next
players (including the blinder) can follow if their card is
greater than c0, and fold otherwise. If a player with a
card c > c0 cannot match the amount of chips of the first
player all-in, he simply bets all his chips, but can only
expect to win this amount from the other all-in players.
• Ultimately, the betting player with the highest card
wins the pot (the blinder gets the blind back if nobody
else bets). The players left with no chips are eliminated,
and after each deal, certain players may be redistributed
to other tables, in a process ensuring that the number of
tables remains minimum at all times. After this round is
completed at all tables, time is updated to t+ 1.
Let us first consider the unrealistic case q = 0. The
amount of chips x(t) of a given player evolves according
to x(t+ 1) = x(t) + ε(t)b(t), where ε(t) has zero average
(there is no winning strategy in the mathematical sense),
and is Markovian, since successive deals are uncorrelated.
If the typical value of x ∼ x¯(t) remains significantly big-
ger than the blind b(t), we can adopt a continuous time
approach. Hence, the evolution of x(t) is that of a gener-
alized Brownian walker: dxdt = σb(t)η(t), where σ
2 = ε¯2 is
a constant of order unity, and η(t) is a δ-correlated white
noise. The number of surviving players with x chips,









with the absorbing boundary condition P (x = 0, t) = 0,
and initial condition P (x, t = 0) = δ(x − x0). This kind
of problem arises naturally in physics in the context of
persistence, which is the probability that a random pro-
cess x(t) never falls below a certain level [9, 10]. Defining
τ(t) = σ2b20t0(e
2t/t0 − 1)/2, Eq. (1) can be solved by the
method of images [10]:













For t≫ t0, the chips distribution becomes scale invariant


















We find that the decay rate of the N(t) is exactly the
growth rate of the blind, which thus controls the pace of












which only grows logarithmically with the number of
players and the ratio x0/b0. The average stack is pro-
portional to the blind x¯(t) = N0x0/N(t) =
√
pit0σb(t)/2.
When t0 ≫ 1, this expression implies that x¯(t)/b(t)≫ 1,
hence validating the use of a continuous time approach.
Finally, we find that the normalized distribution of chips








, F (X) = 1− e−pi4X2 , (6)
where F (X) =
∫X
0
f(Y ) dY . Equivalently, in the context
of persistence, f is naturally found to be the first excited
eigenstate of the quantum harmonic oscillator [10]. The
scaling function f is universal, i.e. independent of all
the microscopic parameters (b0, t0, x0...). In the insert
of Fig. 1, we plot the normalized distribution f(X) =
x¯(t)P (x, t)/N(t) and F (X) as a function of X = x/x¯(t),
as obtained from extensive numerical simulations of the
present poker model with q = 0. We find a perfect data
collapse on the analytical result of Eq. (6).
We now consider the more realistic case q > 0. A
priori, it seems that q is a new parameter whose precise
value could dramatically affect the dynamics of the game.
In reality, q must be intimately related to the decay rate
t−10 of the number of players, which is imposed by the
exponential growth of the blind. To see this, let us first
compute the decay rate due to the all-in processes. At a
given table, and for small q, the probability that an all-
in process occurs is Pall−in = q
2T (T − 1)/2, where the
factor q2 is the probability that two players go all-in, and
T (T − 1)/2 is the number of such pairs. Expecting q ≪
1, we have neglected all-in processes involving more than
two players. During a two-player all-in process, there is
a probability 1/2 that the losing player is the one with
the smallest stack (he is then eliminated). Cumulating
3the results of the N/T tables, we find the density decay













q2(T − 1) . (8)
We now make the claim that the physically optimal
choice for tall−in (and hence for q) is such that the decay
rate due to all-in processes is equal to the one caused by
the chips fluctuations of order b(t). Since the total decay
rate should remain equal to t−10 , tall−in = 2t0 must hold
(decay rates add up). If tall−in < 2t0, the game is dom-
inated by all-in processes and x(t) can get rapidly large
compared to b(t). The first player to go all-in is acting
foolishly and takes the risk of being eliminated just to win
the (negligible) blind. Inversely, if tall−in > 2t0, players
(especially those with a declining stack) would be foolish
not to make the most of the opportunity to double their
stack by going all-in. We expect that real poker players
would, on average, self-adjust their q to its optimal value.
Finally, we find that q is not a free parameter, but should






We now write the exact evolution equation for the num-
ber of surviving players with x chips, combining the effect











(K(P )− P ), (10)



























and where we have dropped the time variable argument
for clarity. In Eq. (10), the factor 2t0 = q
2(T − 1) is sim-
ply the rate of all-in processes involving the considered
player, without presuming the outcome of the event. In
addition, the first term of Eq. (11) describes processes
where the considered player has doubled his stack by
winning against a player with more chips than him. The
second term corresponds to an all-in process where the
player has won against a player with less chips than him
(and has eliminated this player). Finally, the last term
describes the loss against a player with less chips than
him (otherwise the considered player is eliminated). In-
tegrating Eq. (11) over x, we check that the probability to
0 1 2 3 40
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FIG. 1: We plot the normalized distribution of chips f(X)
and its cumulative sum F (X) obtained from numerical sim-
ulations of our poker model (thin dotted lines, N0 = 10000,
t0 = 2000, x0/b0 = 100, 10000 “tournaments” played). These
distributions are extracted at times for which N(t)/N0 =
50%, 30%, 10% [Insert: for q = 0; dashed lines corresponds
to the exact result of Eq. (6)]. The dashed lines correspond
to the numerical solution of the exact Eq. (12). The data
recorded from 20 real poker tournaments (totalizing 1584
players still in) are also plotted (full lines), and are found
to agree remarkably with the present theory. Note that f(X)
for real tournaments was obtained by differentiating a fitting
function to the actual cumulative sum. We also plot the stan-
dard but noisier bin plot of the distribution of chips in real
poker tournaments (circles).
survive an all-in process is 3
4
, the two first terms adding
up to 1
2
(probability to win). We thus recover the decay









We now look for a scaling solution of Eq. (11) of the
form P (x, t) = λxˆ(t)−2f (x/xˆ(t)) , where the integral of
f is normalized to 1, so that N(t) = λ/xˆ(t). Plugging
this ansatz into Eq. (10), we find that one must have
xˆ(t) ∼ b(t) for all the terms to scale in the same manner.
Defining xˆ(t) =
√
t0σb(t)/2 ∼ x¯(t) ∼ e−t/t0 , and the
scaling variable X = x/xˆ(t), we find that f satisfies














f(X + Y )f(Y ) dY = 0, (12)
with the boundary condition f(0) = 0. We did not suc-
ceed in solving this equation analytically. However, the
small and large X behavior of f(X) can be extracted
from Eq. (12), f(X)∼0 X2 , and f(X)∼+∞ 2µe−µX .
Thus, the universal scaling distribution decays more
slowly than for q = 0. Eq. (12) can be solved numer-
ically using a standard iteration scheme (∼2 minutes of
CPU time on a PC workstation), and we find µ ≈ 1.56.
In Fig. 1, we plot the normalized distribution f(X) as
a function ofX = x/x¯(t) obtained from extensive numer-
















FIG. 2: We plot the average number of chip leaders LN0
as a function of the number of initial players N0, finding a
convincing logarithmic growth (full symbols correspond to the
case q = 0). The insert shows the logarithmic growth of rmax
(defined in the text). The dashed lines correspond to log-
linear fits of the data.
by Eq. (9). We find a perfect data collapse on the nu-
merical solution of the exact scaling equation Eq. (12).
In order to check the relevance of this parameter-free
distribution to real poker tournaments, we visited two
popular on-line poker playing zones, and followed 20 no-
limit Texas hold’em tournaments with an initial number
of players in the rangeN0 ∼ 250−800. When the number
of players was down to the range N ∼ 60− 130, we man-
ually recorded their number of chips [11]. Fig. 1 shows
the remarkable agreement between these data and the
results of the present model. The maximum of the dis-
tribution corresponds to players holding around 55% of
the average stack. In addition, a player owning twice the
average stack (X = 2) precedes 90% of the other players,
whereas a player with half the average stack (X = 1/2)
precedes only 25% of the other players.
We now consider the statistical properties of the player
with the largest amount of chips at a given time, dubbed
the “chip leader”. First, we consider the average number
of chip leaders LN0 in a tournament with N0 initial play-
ers. In many competitive situations arising for instance
in biological evolution models [3, 4] or competing nodes in
a driven network [5], it is found that LN grows logarith-
mically with the number of competing agents N , a result
which has been established analytically in a general com-
petition model [4]. We confirm that in the present model,
with or without all-in processes, the same phenomenon
is observed (see Fig. 2). We have also computed the av-
erage maximum ratio rmax = supt x¯lead/x¯. In the model,
xlead/x¯ increases rapidly on a scale of order t0, and then
decays (almost linearly with time) to ∼ 1.5, where it be-
comes non self-averaging due to large fluctuations at the
end of the tournament. Fig. 2 illustrates the logarithmic
growth of rmax as a function of N0. For N0 = 500, which
is typical of Internet tournaments, we find rmax ≈ 4.6,
which is fully compatible with real data.
Extreme value statistics have recently attracted a lot
of attention from physicists in various contexts [12].
In this regard, we have checked that z = (xlead −
x¯lead)/(x¯2lead − x¯2lead)1/2 is distributed according to the
universal Gumbel distribution g(z) = pi exp[−Z −
exp(−Z)]/
√
6 (where Z = piz/
√
6 + γ, and γ is Euler’s
constant), following a general property of independent or
weakly correlated random variables [12, 13].
In this Letter, we have developed a quantitative theory
of poker tournaments and made the connection between
this problem and persistence in physics, the “leader prob-
lem” in evolution and competition models, and extreme
value statistics. It would be interesting to obtain access
to the full dynamical evolution of a large sample of real-
life poker tournaments, in order to check the predictions
of the model concerning the chip leader [11].
I am very grateful to D. S. Dean and J. Basson for
fruitful remarks on the manuscript.
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